Abstract. We present a very efficient multi-party computation protocol unconditionally secure against an active adversary. The security is maximal, i.e., active corruption of up to t < n/3 of the n players is tolerated. The communication complexity for securely evaluating a circuit with m multiplication gates over a finite field is O(mn 2 ) field elements, including the communication required for simulating broadcast, but excluding some overhead costs (independent of m) for sharing the inputs and reconstructing the outputs. This corresponds to the complexity of the best known protocols for the passive model, where the corrupted players are guaranteed not to deviate from the protocol. The complexity of our protocol may well be optimal. The constant overhead factor for robustness is small and the protocol is practical.
Introduction

Secure multi-party computation
Secure multi-party computation (MPC), as introduced by Yao [Yao82] , allows a set of n players to compute an arbitrary agreed function of their private inputs, even if an adversary may corrupt up to t arbitrary players. Almost any distributed cryptographic protocol can be seen as a multi-party computation, and can be realized with a general MPC protocol. Multi-party computation protocols are an important building block for reducing the required trust and building secure distributed systems. While currently special-purpose protocols (e.g., for collective signing) are considered practical, this paper suggests also that general-purpose protocols may well be practical for realistic applications.
Two different notions of corruption are usually considered. A passive (or curious) adversary may only read the information stored by the corrupted players, without controlling the player's behavior. Hence only privacy of the inputs is an issue to consider, but not the correctness of the result. In contrast, an active adversary can take full control of the corrupted players. Assuring not only the privacy of the inputs, but also the correctness of the outputs (robustness) appears to entail a substantial overhead. For instance, all known protocols make (usually heavy) use of a broadcast sub-protocol for which the optimal known communication complexity is O(n 2 ).
model, it appears very difficult to avoid that for each multiplication gate, every player sends a value to every other player. The new protocol uses Beaver's circuit-randomization technique [Bea91a] and the player-elimination framework from [HMP00] .
Model
We consider the well-known secure-channels model as introduced in [BGW88, CCD88] : The set P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } of n players is connected by bilateral synchronous reliable secure channels. Broadcast channels are not assumed to be available. The goal of the protocol is to compute an agreed function, specified as an arithmetic circuit over a finite field F with |F| > n. The number of multiplication gates in the circuit is denoted by m. To each player P i a unique public value α i ∈ F \ {0} is assigned. The computation of the function is secure with respect to a computationally unbounded active adversary that is allowed to corrupt up to t of the players, where t is a given threshold with t < n/3. Once a player is corrupted, the adversary can read all his information and can make the player misbehave arbitrarily. We consider both static and adaptive adversaries, and distinguish both cases in the analysis whenever necessary. The security of our protocol is unconditional with an arbitrarily small probability of error. More precisely, there is an event that occurs with negligible probability, and as long as this event does not occur, the security of the protocol is perfect.
Protocol Overview
The protocol proceeds in two phases: In a preparation phase, which could actually be performed as a pre-computation independent of the circuit (except an upper bound on the number m of multiplication gates must be known), m random triples a (i) , b (i) , c (i) (for i = 1, . . . , m) with c (i) = a (i) b (i) are t-shared among the players. In the computation phase, the circuit is evaluated gate by gate, where for each multiplication gate one shared triple from the preparation phase is used [Bea91a] .
In the preparation phase, the triples are generated in a very efficient but non-robust manner (essentially with techniques from the passive protocol of [BGW88] ). The generation is divided into blocks, and after each block, the consistency of all triples in this block is verified in a single verification procedure. If a block contains inconsistent triples, this is detected with overwhelming probability, and a set of two players that accuse each other of cheating is identified and eliminated from the protocol execution. The triples from the erroneous block are of course not used. At the end of the preparation phase, we have m triples that are t-shared among the set P ⊆ P of remaining players, and it will be guaranteed that the number t of corrupted players in P is smaller than (|P | − t)/2, which is sufficient for evaluating the circuit.
In the computation stage, for every multiplication one random triple is required. Two linear combinations of the values in this triple must be reconstructed. Therefore, it is important that all triples are shared with the same degree t (for privacy), and that 2t < |P | − t (for reconstructibility).
The fault-localization procedure of the preparation phase is rather involved because it identifies a set of two players, one of whom is corrupted, whereas finding such a set of three players would be easy. However, eliminating a set of three players would violate the condition 2t < n − t, and the t-shared triples would be useless.
As the underlying secret-sharing scheme we use the scheme of Shamir [Sha79] , like in most threshold protocols: In order to t-share a value s, the dealer selects a random polynomial f of degree at most t with f (0) = s, and hands the share s i = f (α i ) to player P i for i = 1, . . . , n. Selecting a random polynomial of degree at most t means to select t random coefficients a 1 , . . . , a t ∈ F and to set f (x) = s + a 1 x + . . . + a t x t . We say that a value s is t-shared among the players if there exists a polynomial f (x) of degree at most t such that f (0) = s and the share s i held by player P i satisfies s i = f (α i ) for i = 1, . . . , n. Such a t-shared value can be efficiently reconstructed by a set P ⊆ P of players, as long as less than (|P | − t)/2 of them misbehave (e.g., see [BW86] ).
Preparation Phase
Overview
The goal of this phase is to generate m t-shared random triples
in such a way that the adversary obtains no information about
, and c (i) (except that c (i) is the product of a (i) and b (i) ). The generation of these triples makes extensive use of the player-elimination framework of [HMP00] :
The triples are generated in blocks of = m/n triples. The triples of a block are generated (in parallel) in a non-robust manner; only at the end of the block, consistency is checked jointly for all triples of the block in a single verification procedure (fault detection). In case of an inconsistency, a set D ⊆ P of two players, at least one of whom is corrupted, is identified (fault localization) and excluded from further computations (player elimination). The triples of the failed block are discarded. Player elimination ensures that at most t blocks fail, and hence in total at most (n + t) blocks must be processed.
More precisely, the consistency verification takes place in two steps. In the first step (fault detection I), the degree of all involved sharings is verified. In other words, the players jointly verify that all sharings produced for generating the triples are of appropriate degree. The second verification step (fault detection II) is performed only if the first verification step is successful. Here, the players jointly verify that for every triple
. If a fault is detected (in either faultdetection step), then all triples in the actual block are discarded. Furthermore, a set D ⊆ P of two players, one of whom is corrupted, is found (fault localization I, resp. fault localization II) and eliminated from further computations. Note that in the fault-localization procedure, the privacy of the triples is not maintained. The triples contain completely random values unrelated to all values of the actual computation.
Both verification steps use n "blinding triples", and the privacy of these triples is annihilated in the verification procedure. Therefore, in each block, + 2n triples are generated. The first verification step verifies the degree of all sharings of the first + n triples, using (and destroying) the remaining n triples for blinding. The second verification step verifies the first triples, using the remaining n triples for blinding. Note that the second verification step requires that the sharings of all + n involved triples are verified to be correct.
During the generation of the blocks, players can be eliminated. At a given step, we denote the current set of players by P , the current number of players by n = |P |, and the maximum number of cheaters in P by t . Without loss of generality, we assume that P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }. During the computation, the inequality 2t < n −t will hold as an invariant. In the beginning, P = P, n = n, and t = t, and trivially 2t < n − t is satisfied. In player elimination, n will be decreased by 2, and t by 1. Clearly, this preserves the invariant.
0. Set P = P, n = n, and t = t. 1. Repeat until n blocks (i.e., n ≥ m triples) succeeded:
1.1 Generate + 2n triples (in parallel) in a non-robust manner (Sect. 4.2). 1.2 Verify the consistency of all sharings involved in the first + n triples (fault detection I, Sect. 4.3). If a fault is detected, identify a set D ⊆ P of two players such that at least one player in D is a cheater, and set P to P \ D, n to n − 2 and t to t − 1 (fault localization I). 1.3 If no fault was detected in Step 1.2, then verify that in the first triples, every player shared the correct values (fault detection II, Sect. 4.4). If a fault is detected, identify a set D ⊆ P of two players, at least one of whom is corrupted, and set P to P \ D, n to n − 2 and t to t − 1 (fault localization II). 1.4 If both verification steps were successful, then the generation of the block was successful, and the first triples can be used. If either verification procedure failed, then all triples of the actual block are discarded.
Generate one t-shared triple (a, b, c)
The purpose of this protocol is to generate one t-shared triple (a, b, c), where c = ab. The generation of this triple is non-robust: verification will take place only at the end of the block. In particular, in order to share a value, the dealer simply computes the shares and sends them to the players; the consistency verification of the sent shares is delayed. The generation of the triple is straight-forward: First, the players jointly generate t -sharings of two random values a and b. This is achieved by having every player share two random values, one for a and one for b, which are then summed up. Then, a t -sharing of c = ab is computed along the lines of [BGW88, GRR98] (passive model): Every player computes the product of his share of a and his share of b. These product shares define a 2t -sharing of c, and c can be computed by Lagrange interpolation. This interpolation is a linear function on the product shares. Hence, a t -sharing of c can be computed as a linear combination of t -sharings of the product shares. Finally, the degrees of the sharings of a, b, and c must be increased from t to t. In order to do so, the players jointly generate three random sharings of 0, each with degree t, and add one of them to the t -sharings of a, b, and c, respectively. These random t-sharings of 0 are generated by first selecting a random t − 1-sharing of a random value, and then multiplying this polynomial by the monomial x.
Note that the protocol for computing a sharing of c = ab relies on the fact that the degree of the sharings of a and b is less than one third of the number of actual players, and it would not work if a and b would be shared with degree t for 3t ≥ n . On the other hand, it is important that finally the sharings of all blocks have the same degree (otherwise the multiplication protocol of Section 5 would leak information about the factors), and t can decrease from block to block. Therefore, first the triple is generated with degree t , and then this degree is increased to t.
Protocol "Generate"
We give the exact protocol for generating one t-shared triple (a, b, c): 1. The players jointly generate t -sharings of random values a and b:
1.1 Every player P i ∈ P selects two random degree-t polynomials f i (x) and g i (x), and hands the shares a ij = f i (α j ) and b ij = g i (α j ) to player P j for j = 1, . . . , n .
The polynomial for sharing
, and the polynomial for sharing b is g(x) = n i=1 g i (x) (thus b = g(0)), and every player P j ∈ P computes his shares of a and b as
2. The players jointly compute a t -sharing of c = ab:
2.1 Every player P i ∈ P computes his product share e i = a i b i , and shares it among the players with the random degree-t polynomial h i (x) (with h i (0) = e i ), i.e., sends the share e ij = h i (α j ) to player P j for j = 1, . . . , n . 2.2 Every player P j computes his share c j of c as
w i e ij , where
3. The players jointly increase the degree of the sharings of a, b, and c to t (this step is performed only if t < t): 3.1 Every player P i ∈ P selects three polynomialsf i (x),ḡ i (x),h i (x) of degree t − 1 at random, and sends the sharesā ij =f i (α j ),b ij =ḡ i (α j ), andc ij =h i (α j ) to player P j for j = 1, . . . , n . 3.2 Every player P j ∈ P computes his t-shares a j , b j , and c j of a, b, and c, respectively, as follows:
Analysis
At the end of the block, two verifications will take place: First, it will be verified that the degree of all sharings is as required (t , respectively t − 1, Section 4.3). Second, it will be verified that in Step 2.1, every player P i indeed shares his correct product share e i = a i b i (Section 4.4).
In the sequel, we analyze the security of the above protocol under the assumption that these two conditions are satisfied. After
Step 1, obviously the assumption that the degree of all sharings is as required immediately implies that the resulting shares a 1 , . . . , a n (respectively b 1 , . . . , b n ) lie on a polynomial of degree t , and hence define a valid sharing. Furthermore, if at least one player in P i ∈ P honestly selected random polynomials f i (x) and g i (x), then a and b are random and unknown to the adversary.
In
Step 2, we need the observation that c can be computed by Lagrange interpolation [GRR98] :
w i e i , where
Assuming that every player P i really shares his correct product share e i with a polynomial h i (x) of degree t , it follows immediately that the polynomial h(x) = n i=1 w i h i (x) is also of degree t , and furthermore
The privacy is guaranteed because the adversary does not obtain information about more than t shares of any polynomial h i (x) (for any i = 1, . . . , n ).
Step 3 is only performed if t < t. Assuming that the polynomialsf i (x),ḡ i (x), andh i (x) of every player P i ∈ P have degree at most t−1, it immediately follows that all the polynomials defined as
also all have degree at most t − 1. Hence, the polynomials xf (x), xḡ(x), and xh(x) have degree at most t, and they all share the secret 0. Thus, the sums f (x) + xf (x), g(x) + xḡ(x), and h(x) + xh(x) are of degree t and share a, b, and c, respectively. The privacy of the protocol is obvious for t ≤ t − 1.
We briefly analyze the communication complexity of the above protocol: Every sharing requires n field elements to be sent, and in total there are 6n sharings, which results in a total of 6n 2 field elements to be communicated per triple.
Verification of the degrees of all sharings in a block
The goal of this fault-detection protocol is to verify the degree of the sharings of + n triples in a single step, using (and destroying) another n triples.
The basic idea of this protocol is to verify the degree of a random linear combination of the polynomials. More precisely, every player distributes a random challenge vector of length + n with elements in F, and the corresponding linear combinations of each involved polynomial is reconstructed towards the challenging player, who then checks that the resulting polynomial is of appropriate degree. In order to preserve the privacy of the involved polynomials, for each verifier one additional blinding polynomial of appropriate degree is added. If a verifier detects a fault (i.e., one of the linearly combined polynomials has too high degree), then the triples of the actual block are discarded, and in a fault-localization protocol, a set D ⊆ P of two players, at least one of whom is corrupted, is found and eliminated.
Protocol "Fault-detection I"
The following steps for verifying the degree of all sharings in one block are performed in parallel, once for every verifier P v ∈ P :
1. The verifier P v selects a random vector [r 1 , . . . , r +n ] with elements in F and sends it to each player P j ∈ P . 2. Every player P j computes and sends to P v the following corresponding linear combinations (plus the share of the blinding polynomial) for every i = 1, . . . , n :
3. P v verifies whether for each i = 1, . . . , n , the shares a
in lie on a polynomial of degree at most t . The same verification is performed for the shares b
in and for the shares c
in , for i = 1, . . . , n . Furthermore, P v verifies whether for each i = 1, . . . , n , the sharesā
lie on a polynomial of degree at most t−1. The same verification is performed for the sharesb
in and for the sharesc
in for i = 1, . . . , n . 4. Finally, P v broadcasts (using an appropriate sub-protocol) one bit according to whether all the 6n verified polynomials have degree at most t , respectively t − 1 (confirmation), or at least one polynomial has too high degree (complaint).
Protocol "Fault-localization I" This protocol is performed if and only if at least one verifier has broadcasts a complaint in
Step 4 of the above fault-detection protocol. We denote with P v the verifier who has reported a fault. If there are several such verifiers, the one with the smallest index v is selected. 5. The verifier P v selects one of the polynomials of too high degree and broadcasts the location of the fault, consisting of the index i and the "name" of the sharing ( a, b, c,ā,b, orc). Without loss of generality, we assume that the fault was observed in the sharing a
in . 6. The owner P i of this sharing (i.e., the player who acted as dealer for this sharing) sends to the verifier P v the correct linearly combined polynomial f
7. P v finds the (smallest) index j such that a (Σ) ij (received from P j in
Step 2) does not lie on the polynomial f (Σ) i (x) (received from the owner P i in Step 6), and broadcasts j among the players in P .
8. Both P i and P j send the list a (1) ij , . . . , a ( +n ) ij , a ( +n +v) ij to P v . 9. P v verifies that the linear combination [r 1 , . . . , r +n ] applied to the values received from P i is equal to f (Σ) i (α j ). Otherwise, P v broadcasts the index i, and the set of players to be eliminated is D = {P i , P v }. Analogously, P v verifies the values received from P j to be consistent with a (Σ) ij received in
Step 2, and in case of failure broadcasts the index j, and D = {P j , P v }.
10. P v finds the (smallest) index k such that the values a (k) ij received from P i and P j differ, and broadcasts k and both values a (k) ij from P i and a (k) ij from P j .
11. Both P i and P j broadcast their value of a (k) ij . 12. If the values broadcast by P i and P j differ, then the localized set is D = {P i , P j }. If the value broadcast by P i differs from the value that P v broadcast (and claimed to be the value received from
Analysis
It follows from simple algebra that if all players are honest, then the above fault-detection protocol will always pass. On the other hand, if at least one of the involved sharings (in any of the +n triples) has too high degree, then every honest verifier will detect this fault with probability at least 1 − 1/|F|. The correctness of the fault-localization protocol can be verified by inspection. There is no privacy issue; the generated triples are discarded.
The fault-detection protocol requires n n( + n) + 6n 2 = n 2 + 7n 3 field elements to be sent and n bits to be broadcast. For fault localization, up to n + 2( + n + 1) = 2 + 3n + 2 field elements must be sent and 2 log n + log 6 + log( + n + 1) + 4 log |F| bits must be broadcast.
Verification that all players share the correct product shares
It remains to verify that in each triple k = 1, . . . , , every player P i shared the correct product share e
Step 2.1 of protocol Generate). Since it is already verified that the sharings of all factor shares are of degree t , it is sufficient to verify that the shares e n lie on a polynomial of degree at most 2t . Note that the at least n − t > 2t shares of the honest players uniquely define this polynomial. The key idea of this verification protocol is the same as in the previous verification protocol: Every verifier P v distributes a random challenge vector, and the corresponding linear combination of the polynomials (plus one blinding polynomial) is opened towards P v . If a fault is detected, then a set D of two players (one of whom is corrupted) can be found with the fault-localization protocol.
Protocol "Fault-detection II"
The following steps are performed for each verifier P v ∈ P in parallel. 1. The verifier P v selects a random vector [r 1 , . . . , r ] with elements in F and sends it to each player P j ∈ P . 2. Every player P j computes and sends to P v the following linear combinations (with blinding) for every i = 1, . . . , n :
3. P v verifies whether for each i = 1, . . . , n the shares e
in lie on a polynomial of degree at most t , and if so, whether the secrets e Σ 1 , . . . , e Σ n of the above sharings (computed by interpolating the corresponding shareshares) lie on a polynomial of degree at most 2t . P v broadcasts one bit according to whether all polynomials have appropriate degree (confirmation), or at least one polynomial has too high degree (complaint).
Protocol "Fault-localization II"
We denote with P v the verifier who has reported a fault in Step 3 of the above fault-detection protocol. If there are several such verifiers, the one with the smallest index v is selected.
If in
Step 3, the degree of one of the second-level sharings e (Σ) i1 , . . . , e (Σ) in was too high, then P v applies error-correction to find the smallest index j such that e (Σ) ij must be corrected. Since all sharings have been verified to have correct degree, P v can conclude that P j has sent the wrong value e (Σ) ij . P v broadcasts the index j, and the set of players to be eliminated is D = {P j , P v } (and the following steps need not be performed).
5. Every player P i sends to P v all his factor shares a n for k = 1, . . . , , + v. 7. P v verifies for every i = 1, . . . , n whether the value e Σ i computed in Step 4 is correct, i.e., whether
This test will fail for at least one i, and P v broadcasts this index i. The players in D = {P i , P v } are eliminated.
Analysis
The above fault-detection protocol always passes when all players are honest. If the degree of at least one of the involved sharings is higher than 2t , then every honest verifier will detect this fault with probability at least 1 − 1/|F|. The correctness of the fault-localization protocol follows by inspection.
The fault-detection protocol requires n(n + n 2 ) = n 2 + n 3 elements to be sent, and n bits to be broadcast. The fault-localization protocol requires 2n( +1) field elements to be sent and log n bits to be broadcast.
Error probabilities and repetitive verifications
We first calculate the probability that a static adversary can introduce a bad triple into a block, without being detected. So assume that in a block, at least one triple is bad. This is detected by every honest player with probability 1 − 1/|F|. Hence, the probability that no honest player detects (and reports) the inconsistency is at most |F| −(n −t ) . Once the bad block is detected, one corrupted player is eliminated. Hence the adversary can try t times to make pass a bad block, and the probability that (at least) one of these trials is not detected (and the protocol is disrupted) is at most
. If the adversary is adaptive, he can decide whether or not to corrupt the verifier after the challenge vector is known. Hence, a bad block passes the verification step if at least n − t of the challenge vectors cannot discover the fault, and this happens with probability at most
Again, the adversary can try t times to make pass a bad block, which results in an overall error probability of t−1 i=0 (3/|F|) n−t−i ≤ (3/|F|) n−2t . If the above error probabilities are too high, they can further be decreased by simply repeating the fault-detection protocols (with new and independent blinding triples). By repeating the protocol k times, the error probability is lowered to (1/|F|) k(n−2t) (static case), respectively (3/|F|) k(n−2t) (adaptive case).
Computation Phase
The evaluation of the circuit is along the lines of the protocol of [Bea91a] . Slight modifications are needed because the degree t of the sharings and the upper bound t on the number of cheaters need not be equal. Furthermore, special focus is given to the fact that in our protocol, also eliminated players must be able to give input to and receive output from the computation.
From the preparation phase, we have m random triples
, where the sharings are of degree t among the set P of players. The number of corrupted players in P is at most t with 2t < n − t, where n = |P |. This is sufficient for efficient computation of the circuit.
Input sharing
First, every player who has input secret-shares it (with degree t) among the set P of players. We use the verifiable secret-sharing protocol of [BGW88] (with perfect security), with a slight modification to support t = t . The dealer is denoted by P, and the secret to be shared by s. We do not assume that P ∈ P (neither P ∈ P). 1. The dealer P selects at random a polynomial f (x, y) of degree t in both variables, with p(0, 0) = s, and sends the polynomials f i (x) = f (α i , x) and g i (x) = p(x, α i ) to player P i for i = 1, . . . , n . 2. Every player P i ∈ P sends to P j for j = i + 1, . . . , n the values f i (α j ) and g i (α j ). 3. Every player P j broadcasts one bit according to whether all received values are consistent with the polynomials f j (x) and g j (x) (confirmation) or not (complaint). 4. If no player has broadcast a complaint, then the secret-sharing is finished, and the share of player P j is f j (0). Otherwise, every player P j who has complaint broadcasts a bit vector of length n , where a 1-bit in position i means that one of the values received from P i was not consistent with f j (x) or g j (x). The dealer P must answer all complaints by broadcasting the correct values f (α i , α j ) and f (α j , α i ). 5. Every player P i checks whether the values broadcast by the dealer in Step 4 are consistent with his polynomials f i (x) and g i (x), and broadcasts either a confirmation or an accusation. The dealer P answers every accusation by broadcasting both polynomials f i (x) and g i (x) of the accusing player P i , and P i replaces his polynomials by the broadcast ones. 6. Every player P i checks whether the polynomials broadcast by the dealer in
Step 5 are consistent with his polynomials f i (x) and g i (x), and broadcasts either a confirmation or an accusation. 7. If in Steps 5 and 6, there are in total at most t accusations, then every player P i takes f i (0) as his share of s. Otherwise, clearly the dealer is faulty, and the players take a default sharing (e.g., the constant sharing of 0). It is clear that an honest player never accuses an honest dealer. On the other hand, if there are at most t accusations, then the polynomials of at least n − 2t > t honest players are consistent, and these polynomials uniquely define the polynomial f (x, y) with degree t. Hence, the polynomials of all honest players are consistent, and their shares f 1 (0), . . . , f n (0) lie on a polynomial of degree t.
This protocol communicates 3n 2 field elements, and it broadcasts n bits (in the best case), respectively n 2 + 3n + 2t 2 log |F| bits (in the worst case).
Evaluation of the circuit
The circuit is evaluated gate by gate. Linear gates can be evaluated without any communication due to the linearity of the used sharing. Multiplication gates are evaluated according to [Bea91a] : Assume that the factors x and y are t-shared among the players. Furthermore, a t-shared triple (a, b, c) with c = ab is used. The product xy can be written as follows:
The players in P reconstruct the differences d x = x − a and d y = y − b. This reconstruction is possible because 2t < n − t (e.g., see [BW86] ). Note that reconstructing these values does not give any information about x or y, because a and b are random. Then, the following equation holds:
This equation is linear in a, b, and c, and we can compute linear combinations on shared values without communication. This means that the players can compute the above linear combination on their respective shares of x and y and they receive a t-sharing of the product xy. More details can be found in [Bea91a] . This multiplication protocol requires two secret-reconstructions per multiplication gate. Secret-reconstruction requires every player in P to send his share to every other player (who then applies error-correction to the received shares and interpolates the secret). The communication costs per multiplication gate are hence 2n 2 . Broadcast is not needed.
Output reconstruction
Any player P can receive output (not only players in P or in P). In order to reconstruct a shared value x towards player P, every player in P sends his share of x to P, who then applies error-correction and interpolation to compute the output x. In the error-correction procedure, up to (n − t − 1)/2 ≥ t errors can be corrected (e.g., see [BW86] ). Reconstructing one value requires n field elements of communication, and no broadcast.
Probabilistic functions
The presented protocol is for deterministic functions only. In order to capture probabilistic functions, one can generate one (or several) blocks with single values a (i) only (with simplified verification), and use these values as shared randomness.
Alternatively, but somewhat wastefully, one just picks the value a (i) from a shared triple a (i) , b (i) , c (i) , and discards the rest of the triple. Then, m denotes the number of multiplication gates plus the number of "randomness gates".
On-going computations
In an on-going computation, inputs and outputs can be given and received at any time during the computation, not only at the beginning and at the end. Furthermore, it might even not be specified beforehand which function will be computed. An example of an on-going computation is the simulation of a fair stock market.
In contrast to the protocol of [HMP00] , the proposed protocol can easily be extended to capture the scenario of on-going computations. First, the players generate triples (a, b, c) with c = ab, and perform the computation until all triples are exhausted. Then, a new block of triples is generated, and so on.
Complexity Analysis
A detailed complexity analysis is given in Appendix A. Here we summarize the most important results: Let n denote the number of players, F the field over which the function (circuit) is defined, m the number of multiplication gates in the circuit, C d the depth of the circuit, n I the number of inputs and n O the number of outputs of the function. Evaluating this circuit securely with respect to an active adversary corrupting any t < n/3 of the players is possible with communicating 14mn 2 + O(n I n 4 + n O n + n 4 ) field elements. The number of communication rounds is C d + O(n 2 ). All complexities include the costs for simulating broadcast. If the field F is too small (and the resulting error probability is too high), then fault-detection protocols are repeated, and the overall communication complexity increases accordingly.
This complexity should be compared with the complexity of the most efficient protocols. In the secure-channels model, the most efficient protocol for unconditionally secure multi-party protocols [HMP00] requires O(mn 3 ) field elements in O(C d + n 2 ) rounds (where both hidden constants are slightly higher than ours).
For completeness, we also compare the complexity of our protocol with the complexity of the most efficient protocol for the cryptographic model [CDN01] . This protocol requires a communication complexity of O(mn 3 ) field elements in O(C d n) rounds. The high round complexity results from the fact that the protocol invokes a broadcast sub-protocol for each multiplication gate. The most efficient broadcast protocols require O(n) rounds. Constant-round broadcast protocols are known [FM88] , but they have higher communication complexities and would results in a communication complexity of O(mn 5 ) field elements.
Finally, we compare the protocol with the most efficient known protocol for passive security, namely [BGW88] with the simplification of [GRR98] . This protocol communicates mn 2 + O(n I n + n O n) field elements. Hence, for large enough circuits, robustness can be achieved with a communication overhead factor of about 14.
Conclusions and Open Problems
We have presented a protocol for secure multi-party computation unconditionally secure against an active adversary which is (up to a small constant factor) as efficient as protocols with passive security. The protocol provides some (arbitrarily small) probability of error. Note that due to the player-elimination technique, this error-probability does not grow with the length of the protocol (like in all previous MPC protocols with error probability), but only in the upper bound t of the number of corrupted players.
It remains open whether quadratic complexity can also be achieved in other models. In the unconditional model with perfect security, the most efficient protocol requires communication of O(n 3 ) field elements per multiplication gate [HMP00] . In the unconditional model with broadcast (with small error probability), the most efficient protocol requires O(n 4 ) field elements to be broadcast per multiplication gate [CDD + 99,Feh00]. In the cryptographic model (where up to t < n/2 of the players may be corrupted), the most efficient protocol requires communication of O(n 3 ) field elements (and O(n) rounds!) per multiplication gate [CDN01] . A very recent result for Boolean circuits achieves essentially the same communication complexity per multiplication, but in a constant number of rounds for the whole circuit [DN01] .
Also, it would be interesting to combine the techniques of this paper with the techniques of papers with protocols that require a constant number of rounds only (but have a high communication complexity), to achieve a multi-party protocol which has both low communication complexity and very low round complexity.
Furthermore, the presented protocol is for the synchronous model. Some realworld networks appear to be more appropriately modeled by the asynchronous model, and the protocol must be adapted for this setting. It seems that this can be done along the lines of [BCG93,Can95,SR00].
Finally, it would be interesting to have a proof that quadratic complexity is optimal for passive security. This would immediately imply that the protocol of this paper is optimally efficient (up to a constant factor).
